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THE DISPOSAL OF ATTACHED OR GARNISHED
PROPERTY: A PROCEDURAL KNOT
[Editors Note: After this note had been sent to the printer the
California legislature amended section 542b (Cal. Stat. 1971, ch.
1359). This amendment permits the court, upon motion and for
good cause, to order extensions of the three year time limit; each ex-
tension may be for up to one year, but the total of all extensions may
not exceed two years. This note deals with the disposal of property
once the attachment or garnishment has expired. The amendment
lengthens the time before the disposal must be made from three to a
maximum of five years. However, the amendment does not correct
the basic inconsistency between sections 544 and 542b.]
There is a major inconsistency, under certain conditions, in two
California statutes dealing with the return of property when a writ of
attachment or garnishment is released or expires. To avoid unneces-
sary repetition, it should be noted at the outset that under the stat-
utes the terms "attachment" and "garnishment" are treated as synony-
mous. One of these provisions, section 542b of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, requires the sheriff to return the garnished property to the prin-
cipal defendant or his successor after the property has been in the pos-
session of the sheriff for three years or longer.1 Section 544, on the
other hand, requires the sheriff to return the property to the party from
whom it was received after release or discharge of the garnishment.2
1. "An attachment or garnishment on personal property, whether heretofore
levied or hereafter to be levied, shall, unless sooner released or discharged, cease to
be of any force or effect and the property levied on be released from the operation of
such attachment or garnishment, at the expiration of three years after the issuance of
the writ of attachment under which said levy was made; and the property levied on
shall be delivered to the defendant or his order or to his assignee or executor or ad-
ministrator." CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 542b (West 1954) (emphasis added).
2. "All persons having in their possession, or under their control, any credits or
other personal property belonging to the defendant, or owing any debts to the de-
fendant at the time of service upon them of a copy of the writ and notice, as provided
in this chapter, shall be, unless such property be delivered up or transferred, or such
debts be paid to the sheriff, constable, or marshal, liable to the plaintiff for the
amount of such credits, property, or debts, until the attachment or garnishment be
released or discharged or any judgment recovered by him be satisfied.
' The levying officer shall release such attachment or garnishment in full or in
part as required, by issuing a written release addressed to the person served with the
copy of the writ and notice, upon (1) written direction of the plaintiff or his attorney,
or (2) upon receipt by the officer of an order of the court in which the action is
pending, or a certified copy thereof, discharging or dissolving the attachment or gar-
Therefore, if the garnishment or attachment of the property extended
beyond three years, the property could be returned either to the de-
fendant or to a third person from whom the property had been received.
In order to further illustrate this conflict in the statutes the fol-
lowing hypothetical situation is presented:
A sues B and causes a writ of garnishment to be issued against C
who is indebted to B. C then deposits the property described in
the writ of garnishment with the sheriff in accordance with section
544. Three years later, there has not yet been a final adjudication
in the lawsuit between A and B. Since more than three years
have passed after the issuance of the writ of garnishment, section
542b requires the sheriff to return the property to B. Section
544, on the other hand, directs the sheriff to return the prop-
erty to C, when the garnishment has been released or discharged.
As indicated by the above illustration, the conflict between sec-
tions 542b and 544 arises only when three years or more have expired
from the time of the issuance of the writ of garnishment and no judg-
ment has been rendered in the principal action.
This statutory conflict was discussed in Booloodian v. Ohanesian,3
a recent case decided by the California Court of Appeal for the Fifth
District. The court recognized, but was not required to resolve, the
conflict created by the two code sections. This note will analyze sec-
tions 542b and 544 both in the factual setting of Booloodian and in
light of past decisions of the courts which have interpreted the two stat-
utes. Since difficulties are encountered in achieving a satisfactory ad-
ministrative determination in the disposal of property released from at-
tachment or garnishment because of this conflict in the two statutes,
this note will also discuss possible statutory modifications which could
be made to eliminate this conflict.
4
Booloodian v. Ohanesian-The Factual Setting
On June 19, 1963, the plaintiff sued the defendant on a note, and
on the same day caused a writ of garnishment to be issued against a
third person, the garnishee, who was indebted to the defendant. Pur-
suant to this writ, the garnishee paid $2,757 to the sheriff to avail him-
self of the protection offered by section 544 of the Code of Civil Pro-
nishment or releasing the property; provided, no appeal is perfected and undertaking
executed and filed as provided in Section 946 of this code or a certificate to that effect
has been issued by the clerk of the court, or (3) in all other cases provided by law.
There shall be no liability for such persons acting in conformity with such releases
or for such officers releasing such attachments or garnishments in accordance with
the foregoing." Id. § 544 (West Supp. 1971) (emphasis added).
3. 13 Cal. App. 3d 635, 91 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1970).
4. See text accompanying notes 63-74 infra.
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cedure. 5 On August 9, 1963, the garnishee filed a petition in bank-
ruptcy under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act." Promptly thereaf-
ter, the bankruptcy court issued a stay specifically forbidding the plain-
tiff, defendant and others from enforcing their liens or obligations
against the garnishee until a final determination could be made in the
bankruptcy proceedings.7 Four years later, in November 1967, the su-
perior court, pursuant to stipulations,' issued an order dissolving the
garnishment. Thereafter, the plaintiff, following the procedure in sec-
tion 544, gave written directions to the sheriff to pay the $2,757, which
had been obtained in the original garnishment, to the referee in bank-
ruptcy and the garnishee jointly, and the sheriff made out the check ac-
cordingly.
On June 3, 1968, judgment was rendered for the defendant in the
action brought against her on the note, and the plaintiff did not appeal.
Since the lawsuit had been terminated in her favor the defendant, pur-
suant to section 542b, moved to have the garnishment on the $2,757
dissolved and to have the sheriff pay the money to her on the basis that
the prior release by the plaintiff was improper. This motion was de-
nied by the superior court, which held that section 544, rather than
section 542b,9 was controlling, and that the prior disposition of the
property was therefore proper.
Section 542b provides that, after three years from the date of the
service of the writ of attachment or garnishment, such attachment or
garnishment ceases to be of any effect and "the property levied on shall
be delivered to the defendant or his order or to his assignee or executor
or administrator." On appeal, the defendant claimed that this section
compelled the sheriff to pay the $2,757 to her since more than three
years had elapsed since the original garnishment had been issued. The
defendant also contended that the plaintiff had no power to execute the
unilateral release of the garnishment.
The plaintiff, on the other hand, claimed that section 544 of the
Code of Civil Procedure was controlling and that the sheriff's release
5. The express provisions of this section allow the garnishee to shield himself
from potential liability to the plaintiff by paying or turning over the subject of the
garnishment to the sheriff.
6. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-99 (1970).
7. 13 Cal. App. 3d at 639, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 926. See 11 U.S.C. § 714
(1970). The $2,757 remained in the sheriff's possession until November, 1967.
8. 13 Cal. App. 3d at 639, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 926. The stipulations did not ap-
pear in the record sent to the court of appeal; this cast some doubt as to whether or
not the defendant had agreed to them.
9. See also CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 553 (West Supp. 1971), which provides that
if the defendant recovers judgment against the plaintiff and no appeal is taken, any
property attached by the sheriff is to be returned to the defendant. Of course an
attachment does not involve property of a third party.
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of the funds to the original garnishee was therefore proper. Section 544
provides that when an attachment or garnishment is released, dis-
charged or expires, the sheriff is to release the property to the person
originally served with the writ of attachment or garnishment; in this
case, the garnishee. 10
The court of appeal noted initially that the defendant had not
made the sheriff a party in the current proceedings and that the court
was unable to bind the sheriff or adjudicate his rights without his pres-
ence. The court also pointed out that the sheriff would be exempt
from liability in any event for releases of attached or garnished property
under section 544." The court's reasoning, of course, assumed that
section 544 was controlling in the case; a proposition to be further ex-
plored below. 1
2
The appellate court acknowledged, as had the lower court, that
there was a basic inconsistency between sections 542b and 544. How-
ever, under the peculiar facts of the case, it was not necessary to resolve
this conflict since it was held that section 542b was inapplicable.
First, the court noted that the three year period of section 542b "is
analogous to a statute of limitations."13 Once this determination had
been made by the court, the use of section 542b was prevented by in-
voking a provision of the bankruptcy act, which tolls all statutes of
limitation during the pendency of bankruptcy proceedings. 14  In thus
finding section 542b inapplicable to the case in question, the court
10. Id. § 544.
11. Id.
12. See text accompanying notes 13-17 infra.
13. 13 Cal. App. 3d at 640, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 926, citing Boyle v. Hawkins, 71
Cal. 2d 229, 239, 455 P.2d 97, 103, 78 Cal. Rptr. 161, 167 (1969).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 791 (1970) provides: "All statutes of limitation affecting
claims provable under this chapter and the running of all periods of time prescribed by
this title in respect to the commission of acts of bankruptcy, the recovery of prefer-
ences and the avoidance of liens and transfers shall be suspended while a proceeding
under this chapter is pending and until it is finally dismissed."
The appellant argued that section 542b is only a statute of duration rather than a
statute of limitation; i.e., it limits the remedy and not the right to that remedy, and
consequently, the tolling effect of 11 U.S.C. § 791 (1970) did not apply. Appellant's
Petition for Hearing at 5-9, Booloodian v. Ohanesian, 13 Cal. App. 3d 635, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 923 (1970).
In Robinson v. S & S Dev. Corp., 256 Cal. App. 2d 13, 63 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1967),
the court, in discussing constitutionally prescribed mechanic's liens (CAL. CONST. art.
XX, § 15), held that a ninety-day limitation on the efficacy of such liens was a statute
of limitation was tolled by 11 U.S.C. § 791 (1970). Since sections 537-40 of
the Code of Civil Procedure grant the rights of attachment and garnishment while
section 542b of the same code limits these rights, it seems that appellant's argument
is unsound, by anology, under the reasoning of Robinson. Cf. Dower v. Bomar, 313
F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1963); In re Warren, 192 F. Supp. 801 (W.D. Wash. 1961); Eng-
strom v. DeVos, 81 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Wash. 1949).
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was able to sustain the application of section 544 and the concomitant
propriety of the sheriff's release.' 5
The court also found no merit in the defendant's claim that the
plaintiff was without power to -unilaterally release an attachment or
garnishment, and referred to cases in which the courts had sustained
precisely that same power.16 The court noted that section 544 specifi-
cally commanded the sheriff to execute a release upon "written direc-
tion of the plaintiff or his attorney.' 17
Although the court in Booloodian did not have to deal with the
inconsistency between the two code sections, there is, nevertheless, the
possibility that the issue may arise in the future, and the courts may not
always be able to so neatly avoid the problem. It would seem appro-
priate, therefore, to further analyze the two sections in an effort to il-
luminate the conflict. Earlier constructions of these sections by the
courts will be discussed briefly in an effort to seek out and offer pro-
posals for the solution of this unresolved conflict.
Sections 542b and 544-The Present Conflict
Section 542b applies to all attachments and garnishments and pro-
vides that they will expire at the end of three years after the issuance of
the writ, unless sooner released.' However, section 542b does not,
in itself, specify how such an early release may be effectuated. Sec-
tion 544, in contrast, contains no express time limitation, but does con-
tain three methods for the release of attachments or garnishments.'0
The most troublesome aspect of the two sections arises when, prior
to any judgment in the principal suit, the sheriff is required to release
the attached or garnished property. Section 542b unequivocally states
that upon the expiration of three years (unless sooner released), the
sheriff must return all property in his possession to the defendant, re-
gardless from whom the property was originally acquired.20 Section
544, on the other hand, directs the sheriff to release the property to the
person served with the writ of attachment or garnishment upon the re-
lease of the writ.2 '
15. 13 Cal. App. 3d at 640, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
16. Id. at 638, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 924, citing Smith v. Robinson, 64 Cal. 387,
1 P. 353 (1883) where the court stated that "[tjhe claim of respondent's counsel that
real property attached as this was can only be released by order of court is not, in our
opinion, tenable;" accord Bachelder v. Perley, 53 Me. 414 (1866); Southwestern
Broom & Warehouse Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 52 Okla. 422, 153 P. 204 (1915).
17. See CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 544 (West Supp. 1971).
18. Id. § 542b (West 1954).
19. Id. § 544 (West Supp. 1971). See text accompanying notes 49-55 infra.
20. Id. § 542b (West 1954).
21. Id. § 544 (West Supp. 1971).
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Section 542b
Of particular significance to the problem, as seen in Booloodian,
is the recognition that section 542b is analogous to a statute of limita-
tion. This construction of section 542b was first enunciated by the
California Supreme Court in Boyle v. Hawkins.2 2  In that case, the
plaintiff was suing to enforce the garnishee's liability under section 544;
the defendant (garnishee in the principal action) had refused to deliver
up some $6,000 given to her for safekeeping by the principal defend-
ant. 23 The defendant asserted that because more than three years had
elapsed since the garnishment was made, section 542b automatically re-
leased the garnishment.2 4  The court, however, noting that the plaintiff
had filed this complaint before the three years had elapsed, held that
[t]he filing of a complaint under section 544 must prevent the "re-
lease" time from running for purposes of the liability imposed by
that section; otherwise a defendant could always frustrate the im-
position of liability by a skillful application of the motion and dis-
covery practices for purposes of delay.25
The court was clearly concerned with the possibility of deliberate stall-
ing maneuvers by the defendant to nullify an attachment or garnish-
ment. While the Boyle case involved a delaying defendant-garnishee.
the possibility of intentional delay would likewise seem to exist when
the defendant is not the garnishee.2 6
At least one case has held that an attachment or garnishment does
not have a minimum time limit but is restricted by section 542b to a
maximum of three years. 27  Moreover, even an appeal and the filing
of an undertaking bond cannot extend this period.2"
In contrast to the above view is the early decision of Estate of
Troy,29 where the court of appeal held that the only purpose of sec-
tion 542b was to compel diligence on the part of the attaching plain-
tiff.3" The court also held that intervening delays beyond the control
22. 71 Cal. 2d 229, 455 P.2d 97, 78 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1969).
23. Id. at 232, 455 P.2d at 98-99, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 162-63.
24. Id. at 238, 455 P.2d at 103, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
25. Id. at 239, 455 P.2d at 103, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
26. In Booloodian the defendant relied heavily on Arcturus Mfg. Corp. v. Su-
perior Court, 223 Cal. App. 2d 187, 35 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1963) in which the court
allowed an otherwise valid garnishment to expire; however, it appears that the pretrial
delay was caused by the plaintiff. But more importantly, this case did not include the
element of the garnishee's intervening bankruptcy and its concomitant tolling of stat-
utes of limitation under 11 U.S.C. § 791 (1970).
27. Durkin v. Durkin, 133 Cal. App. 2d 283, 284 P.2d 185 (1955).
28. United States Liability Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 252 Cal. App. 2d 557, 60
Cal. Rptr. 723 (1967). But cf. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 542a (West 1954) (exten-
sion of attachment on realty).
29. 1 Cal. App. 2d 732, 37 P.2d 471 (1934).
30. Id. at 736, 37 P.2d at 472.
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of the plaintiff (here a probate proceeding) would not cause the at-
tachment or garnishment to lapse.31
There is another line of cases in which the courts have been able
to suspend the operation of section 542b. In California Home Exten-
sion Association v. Hilborn,32 the defendant paid money into the court
to secure the release of an attachment on certain property with the
stipulation that the money was to be held on deposit until a final de-
termination was made in the case." The court held that the defendant
could not claim an automatic release at the expiration of three years un-
der section 542b, and he would be held to his stipulation.34 In an-
other recent case,3 5 the court held that where the parties agree to have
the property released, there is a contract between them which will con-
stitute a sufficient release under section 542b, and the three year period
included in section 542b does not apply.36
In summary, section 542b is of no force and effect on an other-
wise valid attachment or garnishment when there is some unavoidable
intervening delay which necessitates a wait of more than three years be-
tween the time of the service of the writ and the final outcome of the
principal case.37 Further, an attachment or garnishment does not
expire when a timely complaint has been filed before the three year
period of section 542b has lapsed.38 Also, where some contractual
arrangement between the parties has superseded the attachment or
garnishment, section 542b has been held not to apply. 9
Section 544
Section 544 provides for the direct imposition of liability upon
any person who has possession of the property or credits of the princi-
pal defendant,40 or who owes money to the principal defendant, at
the time of the service of the writ.41 Service of the writ of attachment
31. id.
32. 115 Cal. App. 2d 634, 252 P.2d 368 (1953).
33. id. at 635, 252 P.2d at 369.
34. Id. at 636, 252 P.2d at 369.
35. Shepherd v. Miles & Sons, Inc., 10 Cal. App. 3d 7, 89 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970).
36. Id. at 13, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 26-27.
37. In re Estate of Troy, 1 Cal. App. 2d 732, 37 P.2d 471 (1934). But see
United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 252 Cal. App. 2d 557, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 723 (1967); Durkin v. Durkin, 133 Cal. App. 2d 283, 284 P.2d 185 (1955).
38. Boyle v. Hawkins, 71 Cal. 2d 229, 455 P.2d 97, 78 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1969).
39. Shepherd v. Miles & Sons, Inc., 10 Cal. App. 3d 7, 89 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970);
California Home Extension Ass'n v. Hilborn, 115 Cal. App. 2d 634, 252 P.2d 368
(1953).
40. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 544 (West Supp. 1971).
41. Id. See also Smith v. Crocker First Nat'l Bank, 152 Cal. App. 2d 832,
314 P.2d 237 (1957).
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or garnishment on such a third person creates a direct liability between
that party and the attaching plaintiff provided the plaintiff prevails in
the principal action.4 2 This contingent liability continues until the gar-
nishee turns over the property, or pays the debt to the sheriff. 3 The
liability of the garnishee under section 544 may also be extinguished if
the writ is discharged or the judgment is satisfied.4" A payment to
the sheriff by the garnishee may admit the indebtedness to the defend-
ant, but will not necessarily entitle the defendant to payment of the debt
because of the existence of possible defenses to the debt. 45 In addition,
the payment to the sheriff has no conclusive effect on the title to the
money, 46 and the plaintiff would be forced to prove the debt between
the defendant and the garnishee before it could be enforced.17
Unlike 542b, section 544 establishes a method for release of the
writ of attachment or garnishment and also specifies the means of dis-
posal of the property when such a release occurs. A release of attached
or garnished property, under section 544, may take one of three forms:
(1) a written release executed by the plaintiff or his attorney, (2) a
court order discharging the writ, or (3) a release in any other manner
prescribed by law.48  Upon the happening of one of these events the
sheriff is instructed to release the property to the person served with
the writ.40
The first method-the written release by the plaintiff-appears to
be a codification of prior California case law, which held that the at-
taching plaintiff may, on his own volition, release an attachment or
garnishment at any time he desires.5" Therefore, both under prior de-
cisions and section 544, a sheriff releasing property under such a writ-
ten order would be acting properly. The sheriff is required only to use
42. Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Bank of Italy, 216 Cal. 452, 14 P.2d 527
(1932).
43. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 544 (West Supp. 1971).
44. Id.
45. Broadway Ins. Co. v. Wolters, 128 Cal. 162, 166, 60 P. 766, 767 (1900).
46. National Bank of New Zealand v. Finn, 81 Cal. App. 317, 327, 253 P. 757,
761 (1927). The court noted that the garnishee's action under section 544 "has no
determinative effect upon the title or ownership of the property or credits denied to be
held, admitted to be held or delivered to the sheriff."
47. See Takahashi v. Kunishima, 34 Cal. App. 2d 367, 93 P.2d 645 (1939);
Bunnell v. Wynns, 13 Cal. App. 2d 114, 56 P.2d 267 (1936).
48. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 544 (West Supp. 1971).
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Smith v. Robinson, 64 Cal. 387, 1 P. 353 (1883); accord, Bachel-
der v. Perley, 53 Me. 414 (1866); Southwestern Broom & Warehouse Co. v. City Nat'l
Bank, 52 Okla. 422, 153 P. 204 (1915). See generally 5 CAL. JUR. 2o Attachment and
Garnishment § 75 (rev. ed. 1967).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23
reasonable care in executing releases secured under court order.51 To
require the sheriff to investigate the legal "technicalities" of every court
order would be "subjecting him to constant danger of liability [and]
would be an intolerable hardship .. .52
Section 544 also provides for releases in other cases as provided
by law. As in Booloodian, this would include attachments or garnish-
ments obtained within four months of the filing of bankruptcy by the
person served with the writ, which can be avoided by the trustee in
bankruptcy.5 z It could certainly be argued that this section also includes
automatic releases after three years, as provided by section 542b.54
Furthermore, section 544 provides that there will be no liability for
"persons" or "officers" acting in conformity with the statute.55
51. Hayward Lumber & Inv. Co. v. Biscailuz, 47 Cal. 2d 716, 306 P.2d 6 (1957).
See also CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 26606-08 (West 1968).
52. Hayward Lumber & Inv. Co. v. Biscailuz, 47 Cal. 2d 716, 722, 306 P.2d 6, 10
(1957).
The specific statutory duties of the sheriff, constable, or marshal are contained in
CAL. GovT. CODE § 26600-13 (West 1968). Of special relevance is section 26606
which commands the sheriff to "release on the record all attachments of real property
and [to] give the required written release of attachments or garnishments of personal
property when the attachment or garnishment placed in his hands has been released
[Query: How is this release to be accomplished?] or discharged either in full or in
part."
In regard to the service of notices such as court ordered releases or plaintiff's re-
leases, the sheriff is to "serve all process and notices in the manner prescribed by
law." Id. § 26608.
"'Notice' includes all papers and orders required to be served in any proceeding
before any court, board, or officer, or when required by law to be served independently
of such proceeding. . . ." Id. § 26660(b).
"The sheriff shall certify upon process or notice the manner and time of service,
or if he fails to make service, the reasons of his failure, and return the process or
notices without delay." Id. § 26609.
53. See 11 U.S.C. § 107(a)(1) (1964) which provides in part: "Every lien against
the property of a person obtained by attachment, judgment, levy or other legal or
equitable process or proceedings within four months before the filing of a petition ini-
tiating a proceeding under this title by or against such person shall be deemed null and
void.
54. This problem might, in fact, be compounded if this is the proper construc-
tion. If section 544 applies to releases caused by the expiration of three years as
provided in section 542b, then the sheriff is faced with the choice between delivering
the property to the defendant or the garnishee. Under one or the other code section
either choice would seem to be proper. Read in yet another way, it could be said that
once the three year period elapses, the sheriff must refer to section 544 for disposal
instructions; that is, section 544 could be construed to apply to any and all property
disposals no matter how a release is effected.
55. Few cases construing section 544 have reached the appellate level since the
section clearly provides means to effectuate the release of an attachment or garnish-
ment, and also provides clear instruction to the sheriff for disposal of the property
upon such a release.
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From the foregoing analysis, it is readily apparent that the sheriff
or other officer releasing attached or garnished property is confronted
with an underlying conflict in sections 542b and 544 which the courts
have failed to resolve. 56 As will be subsequently discussed, this creates
not only theoretical but also concrete problems for the sheriff or other
officer who attempts to comply with the code when releasing attached
or garnished property.
The Sheriff's Dilemma
Initially, the sheriff is faced with the code's failure to clearly dis-
tinguish between the two terms "garnishment" and "attachment."'57
The code sometimes uses the two terms interchangeably5" and other
times specifies one or the other,59 in effect leaving the sheriff to decide
how the terms are to be interpreted.6" The most serious problems
occur, of course, when there has been a delay of more than three years
between the time of the issuance of the writ of garnishment or at-
tachment and the final determination in the principal suit. At the ex-
piration of the three year period, the sheriff must, according to section
542b, return to the defendant all the property in his possession. If the
property consists of a garnished debt due from a third party to which
there may be defenses, and the garnishee has taken advantage of the
protection offered by section 544 by paying the debt to the sheriff, the
question arises whether the money should be turned over to the de-
fendant, or returned to the garnishee at the end of the three year period.
The defendant has not yet taken any action to prove that he is en-
titled to receive the money paid to the sheriff. Likewise, the garnishee,
by the mere exercise of his rights under section 544, has not admitted
that the defendant is entitled to payment of the debt.61 In fact, the
cases seem to indicate that such a summary proceeding against the gar-
nishee, without affording him "procedural due process," would be
56. There is no such problem when the defendant has prevailed in the principal
action and it is his property that is in the hand of the sheriff. The sheriff is required
to return all of the defendant's property in his hands to the defendant. CAL. CODE
CiV. PROC. § 553 (West Supp. 1971).
57. See note 72 & accompanying text infra.
58. In CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 542b (West 1954) the terms are used inter-
changeably but at the same time the single term "attachment" is apparently used in
that section to apply to both types of proceedings although it is used alone. See also
id. § 544 (West Supp. 1971). In CAL. GOv'T CODE § 26606 (West 1968) the terms
attachment and garnishment are also used interchangeably.
59. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 553 (West Supp. 1971).
60. To be sure sections 542b and 544 do not, in all cases, create problems for the
sheriff or other officer effecting the release. The discussion in this note is limited
to those situations which could actually confuse them.
61. See notes 45-46 & accompanying text supra.
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highly improper.62
Another problem may also arise when there has been some delay
in the principal suit not caused by a lack of diligence on the part of
the plaintiff-for instance, when clogged trial calendars prevent a
prompt trial. If three years pass, must the sheriff pay whatever has
been garnished to the defendant who has done nothing to show that he
has a valid claim to the property? This would hardly square with any
sense of justice or fair-play, especially from the eyes of the garnishee.
It also seems highly unlikely that this result is that intended by the
legislature when enacting these sections.
The problems discussed above are the product of statutory con-
flicts and should properly be resolved by the legislature and not the
courts. Consonant with such a recommendation, therefore, this note
will propose several remedies to the statutory conflict discussed above.
Legislative Proposals
Any proposed statutory revisions would have to consider the in-
terests which would be most affected by such changes. 63 First, while
it may be preferable to give the plaintiff some security for satisfying any
judgment he might recover, it would also appear desirable to minimize
the hardship placed on defendants and garnishees, when property in
their possession is burdened by attachment or garnishment. Some rea-
sonable limitation on the length of time within which an attaching plain-
tiff can burden property should therefore be provided.04
Any legislative changes should also provide the sheriff or other at-
taching officer with clear and simple instructions in order to minimize
possible confusion when disposing of attached or garnished property. 5
Lastly, and perhaps of greatest importance, the statutes should guaran-
tee that property is returned to its rightful owner. In order to accomplish
these three objectives, the legislature might consider the following pro-
posals.
62. See Broadway Ins. Co. v. Wolters, 128 Cal. 162, 60 P. 766 (1900); cf.
Randone v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
It would seem that to allow such a procedure would be to open the doors for pos-
sible collusion between plaintiffs and creditor-defendants in that they might use the
office of the sheriff to collect debts from recalcitrant debtor-garnishees.
63. In light of the decision in Randone v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488
P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971) holding section 537.1 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure unconstitutional, it is likely that many of the procedures for prejudgment
attachment and garnishment in California will soon be substantially revised. This
would give the legislature an excellent opportunity to evaluate and act upon these
proposals.
64. See Jones v. Toland, 117 Cal. App. 481, 4 P.2d 178 (1931).
65. Cf. Hayward Lumber & Inv. Co. v. Biscailuz, 47 Cal. 2d 716, 306 P.2d 6
(1957).
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There would be no conflict in the statutes if section 544 was re-
vised so that it exclusively controlled property disposals under gar-
nishments and attachments, including property released by the plaintiff
or court, and property released by statutory expiration of the writ after
three years.66 This would mean that section 542b would only be con-
cerned with the longevity of attachments or garnishments, and that once
property was no longer subject to the writ, the sheriff would refer to sec-
tion 544 for disposal instructions. This, of course, would require elimi-
nation of the last phrase of section 542b which commands the sheriff
to return to the defendant the property subject to the writ at the expira-
tion of three years from the date of the writ.
An alternative remedy would be to alter the wording of the last
phrase of section 542b to conform with the disposition instructions of
section 544.17 This could be accomplished by inserting the following
phrase to replace the present directions to the sheriff in section 542b:
"and the property levied on shall be returned to the person served with
the copy of the writ and notice." This latter proposal would retain
the current three year limitation. It would also assure the defendant
the prompt return of property taken from his possession, and would as-
sure the garnishee that any property given by him to the sheriff would
be recovered on release or expiration of the writ. Furthermore, since
section 542b mentions releases, it would also be proper to include in
the provision some description of the methods by which such releases
can be effected.68
A third possible approach would be to amend section 542b to
read more like a statute of limitation, especially in light of Boyle v.
Hawkins,69 where the court found the two to be analogous. Such a
revision could include provisions which would prevent automatic termi-
nation after three years (or any other reasonable time) when some
action on the principal suit has been taken,7" or when some delay has
intervened which is not the fault of the plaintiff. 71  However, where
the plaintiff's own delay has caused the time period to expire, then of
course the attachment or garnishment should be terminated.
A fourth, and perhaps more promising solution, would be to re-
66. See note 56 supra.
67. Section 544 provides that "[t]he levying officer shall release such attachment
or garnishment. . . to the person served with the copy of the writ and notice ....
68. The methods of release contained in section 544 might be appropriate. See
text accompanying notes 49-55 supra.
69. 71 Cal. 2d 229, 239, 455 P.2d 97, 103, 78 Cal. Rptr. 161, 167 (1969).
70. See id. at 229, 455 P.2d at 97, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 161 (1969); cf. Jones & Son
Inc. v. Independence Indem. Co., 52 Cal. App. 2d 374, 126 P.2d 463 (1942). But see
United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 252 Cal. App. 2d 557, 60 Cal. Rptr. 723
(1967); Durkin v. Durkin, 133 Cal. App. 2d 283, 284 P.2d 185 (1955).
71. E.g., In re Estate of Troy, 1 Cal. App. 2d 732, 37 P.2d 471 (1934).
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vise both sections 542b and 544. la that event it would be necessary to
distinguish, by statute, between attachment and garnishment. Gar-
nishment would be distinguished as a subset of attachment, whereby
the property of the defendant---chattels, credits or money owed in the
hands of third persons-would be held to satisfy any judgment which
the plaintiff might recover.72 Next, all reference to garnishment would
be deleted from section 542b and all reference to attachment deleted
from section 544. Again, however, provision for the release of at-
tachments would have to be included in the amended section 542b,
since there is presently no such provision in the section.7" Finally, to
prevent the anomaly of a garnishment capable of infinite duration, the
legislature should include a reasonable time limitation in the revision
to section 544.74
Conclusion
This note has pointed out certain inherent problems faced by the
sheriff or other officer when attempting to interpret sections 542b and
544 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the release and return of at-
tached or garnished property; i.e., section 542b provides that the sher-
iff shall return the property to the defendant, while section 544 pro-
vides that the property is to be returned to the party from whom it was
received, who may or may not be the defendant.
The court realized, but was not required to resolve these prob-
lems in Booloodian v. Ohanesian.7 5 That case, however, appears to be
one of the first on the appellate level to at least recognize this conflict,
and it provides a realistic, factual setting to illustrate the problem which
may result from the inherent conflict in the two code sections. In ad-
dition, these two sections fail to make the basic distinction between at-
tachments and garnishments. 7
The proposed statutory changes which have been recommended
would provide maximum security for the plaintiff balanced against a
minimized burden for the defendant or garnishee, and would make a
statutory distinction between the concepts of attachment and garnish-
ment. The proposed revisions to the code sections would also provide
the sheriff with clear, consistent instructions as to the disposal of at-
tached or garnished property. Both sections, as they now stand, are
inadequate. The sheriff or other officer commanded to release at-
tached or garnished property is forced to make a discretionary choice
72. See 5 CAL. JuR. 2D Attachment and Garnishment § 2, at 744-45 (rev. ed.
1967).
73. See text accompanying notes 49-55 supra.
74. E.g., CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 542b (West 1954) (three years).
75. 13 Cal. App. 3d 635, 91 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1970).
76. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
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between the two code provisions without sufficient guidance from the
courts or legislature. There is thus a practical necessity for modifica-
tion and clarification of these code sections to solve the sheriff's di-
lemma. More importantly, however, the revision in the statutes
would further the more fundamental policy of protecting the interests
of both debtors and creditors in the rapidly changing area of attachment
and garnishment. 77
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77. Cf., e.g., Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (prejudgment
wage garnishment held unconstitutional); Randone v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536,
488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971) (prejudgment attachment of bank accounts
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